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Abstract:  
This thesis work examines mobile Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and how they can be 
implemented. Key network protocols, security protocols and security frameworks that are 
presently used in mobile computing and VPNs are examined. The network protocols examined 
are Mobile IP, which has been in commercial use for some time, and Host Identity Protocol (HIP), 
which is still in its development phase and is not commercially implemented yet. The security 
frameworks and protocols examined are IPsec, MOBIKE, SSL/TLS and SSH. Both IPsec and TLS/SSL 
are recognized VPN protocols. SSH is also a common protocol but it is more often used for secure 
remote login and secure file transfer. The biggest issue with mobile VPN is to make legacy hosts 
and software mobile. Depending on what network protocol is being used this is done differently. 
Solutions based on Mobile IP add network hardware. HIP does not demand any additional 
network hardware. HIP implements a new layer into the network protocol stack making the 
mobility transparent to higher layer software. Since the HIP is still under development, testing 
solutions based on HIP has been a difficult task. However, the tests using HIP have been 
surprisingly successful. The important sources for this thesis work have been documentation 
provided by IETF as well as my own testing of different combinations of protocol implementation 
and software. 
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Sammanfattning:  
I detta examensarbete undersöks mobila virtuella privatnät (VPN) och hur dessa kan realiseras. 
Centrala protokoll, datasäkerhetsprotokoll och datasäkerhetsramverk, som används i mobil 
informationshantering idag, undersöks. Nätverksprotokollen som undersöks är Mobile IP, som 
redan en tid varit kommersiellt realiserad i mjukvaror, samt Host Identity Protocol (HIP), som 
ännu är i utvecklingsskedet och ännu inte har realiserats kommersiellt. Datasäkerhetsprotokollen 
och ramverken som undersökts är IPsec, MOBIKE, SSL/TLS och SSH. Både IPsec och SSL/TLS är 
erkända VPN-protokoll. SSH är inte ett protokoll som vanligtvis använts för VPN utan för bl.a. 
säker distansinloggning och säker överföring av filer. Den största utmaningen med mobil VPN är 
huruvida existerande klienter kan utnyttja den mobila funktionaliteten utan stora uppdateringar. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This B.Sc. thesis addresses issues regarding mobile Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
technologies and protocols. The main goal of this report is to examine mobility 
protocols and VPN software and to conduct practical tests with the examined protocols 
and software. The practical tests will examine different solutions functionality regarding 
mobility. This B.Sc. thesis contributes to the WISEciti research project on the topic of 
VPN and Host Identity Protocol. The WISEciti research group include of Helsinki 
Institute of Information Technology (HIIT), Helsinki University, Arcada University of 
Applied Sciences and several business partners. For more information see 
http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/group/wiseciti/. The theoretical part has been carried out in an 
international environment in Kwantlen Polytechnic University in the metropolitan area 
of Vancouver, Canada. The practical part has also partially been done at Kwantlen. This 
environment resulted in extra challenges, which resulted in a report with more insight 
and variety.  
1.1 Background 
A VPN is a group of computers connected to a private network; a network built and 
maintained by an enterprise or other institution solely for its own use with limited 
public-network access. A VPN communicates “securely” over a public network.  
The word mobility in this B.Sc. thesis is used to describe not only the physical mobility 
of a host but also the mobility of the session. A session is a set-up connection between 
two hosts or nodes, and is preserved while at least one of them topologically moves in 
the network. 
The secure communication channel a VPN sets up and uses is called a VPN session. 
Traditionally this session is associated with the hosts Internet Protocol (IP) address 
which makes it highly immobile. To make VPN mobile we can take advantage of 
mobility protocols that address this precise issue of IP being used as both identifier and 
locator for communication. Mobile IP (MIP) and Host Identity Protocol (HIP) are the 
mobility protocols examined in this B.Sc. thesis. They are both great initiatives and 
strong candidates of becoming widely used. More interesting for this B.Sc. thesis is that 
they address the issue from different angles. 
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1.2 Aims and goals 
The main goal of this B.Sc. thesis work is to examine different VPN software solutions 
and different mobility protocols and determine how suited they are for a mobile VPN 
solution. Also the protocols and VPN technologies main building blocks will be 
described. The practical part will present mobile VPN solutions using the described 
software and protocols. There will also be test cases presented for each environment. 
The test cases should be as similar as possible, in order to draw conclusion from their 
outcome. The aim for this work is to create a helpful and interesting report regarding 
VPN and mobility for anyone interested. The practical part will hopefully illustrate 
different ways to implement VPN in a mobile environment. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into two main sections. The first section is theoretical and the 
second practical. The theoretical section will be divided into sub-sections, the first 
regarding VPN and the second regarding network protocols. The second part will 
evaluate different solutions. The evaluations will both be theoretical and practical. The 
practical evaluation will include test cases and implementations that are closely linked 
to the theory described in the theoretical part. The theoretical evaluation will review 
different commercial solutions. For every practical test case a thorough examination and 
explanation will be done. Conclusions regarding practical functionality of applications 
and protocols are presented in the practical conclusion section. Pros and cons regarding 
the software and protocol combinations will also be presented.  
Since the focus of the protocol overview is on VPN features of mobile equipment, you 
might feel that information is missing. All VPN relevant information is included in the 
thesis, other protocol features are not described. The mobility focus is on node mobility. 
Network mobility is not a part of this thesis. 
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2 VPN IMPLEMENTATIONS 
There are presently many ways to implement VPNs. Some implementations are more 
secure and some are easier to use, but the common goal is to create a secure network 
extension to a Local Area Network (LAN) by tunneling technologies. A VPN tunnel is a 
secure communication link between two hosts over an unsecure network e.g. the 
Internet. The link can be of type gateway-to-gateway meaning that it connects two local 
area networks. A client-to-gateway link connects a single computer to a local area 
network and a client-to-client link provides a secure channel between two individual 
computers. The two major and most common ways to accomplish this is using either 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. 
Whichever protocol is used the same level of security and data integrity will be 
achieved. The only difference is how this is implemented by the software utilizing the 
features of the different protocols.   
2.1 IPsec 
IPsec is a framework of open standards for ensuring private communication over IP 
networks. IPsec has become the most commonly used network layer security protocol 
and has reached the status of being a de facto standard in today’s information society. 
IPsec is mainly defined by IETF in RFC 4301 and RFC 4309. There are a however 
many other RFC documents on IPsec since IPsec uses other standards. These standards 
are defined in their own RFC documents, for example Authentication Header is defined 
in RFC 4302 and Internet Key Exchange version 2 in RFC 4306. IPsec provides many 
different types of protection. It maintains confidentiality and integrity, authenticates the 
origin of data, prevents packet replay and traffic analysis, and provides access 
protection (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005. RFC 4301, 2005). 
2.1.1 Building blocks of IPsec 
IPsec has three large building blocks that provide desired features. The blocks also work 
independently but together they provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. 
Independently they only provide their own feature. The blocks are Authentication 
Header (AH), Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP), and Internet Key Exchange 
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protocols (IKE). In this section all these will be described and for each a small example 
will be provided (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005. RFC 4301, 2005).  
Authentication Header 
AH provides integrity for the IP header and payload. AH also authenticates the user. 
AH cannot provide any encryption of the payload, this is done by ESP. Furthermore 
today’s version of ESP has as well as AH the ability to authenticate data. One might 
therefore think that AH is obsolete. The difference is that AH can provide authentication 
for the whole IP packet both header and payload, but ESP can only authenticate the 
payload. However there is IPsec software that solely relies on ESP for authentication 
today, but a lot of legacy software still uses AH (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005. 
RFC 4301, 2005. RFC 4302, 2005).  
AH have two different modes, transport and tunnel mode. The difference between these 
two is that in tunnel mode AH creates a new IP header for the whole IP packet, and 
therefore the term tunnel is used. Transport mode AH does not do this. If the tunnel 
end-point is a gateway then the final destination is a private network behind the 
gateway. Therefore packets have to be addressed to the gateway and a new IP header is 
attached since the final destination must not be changed. If the original IP header is 
changed then the checksums cannot be verified. Transport mode is mainly used in end-
to-end architectures. AH is used to protect the integrity of the whole IP packet. Figure 1 
and Figure 2 illustrate the AH packet in tunnel and transport mode.  
 
Figure 1. AH tunnel mode packet (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005). 
 
Figure 2. AH transport mode packet (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005). 
AH protects the integrity of an IP packet by calculating a checksum of the packet. The 
checksum is used for verification by the receiver. There are in the IP header some fields 
that change during transport, for example Time To Live (TTL), and the IP header 
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checksum. These fields are not included in the AH integrity calculations. These issues 
also explain why AH often is incompatible with Network Address Translation (NAT). 
The IP source and destination fields are included in the AH integrity calculations and 
should not be changed. If a NAT device changes the IP destination from a private to a 
public address then the AH integrity calculation done by the recipient would not match 
the checksum passed along with the packet (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005. RFC 
4301, 2005. RFC 4302, 2005). 
The integrity provided by AH is based on a Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
which is encoded with a keyed hash algorithm. The produced hash is added to the 
packet and the packet is sent to the recipient. The keyed hash algorithm produces a hash 
of both the message and the secret key. The key is shared by both the sender and the 
recipient. Upon the arrival of the packet the recipient regenerates the hash by using the 
same shared key and the message from the packet. If the hashes are equal, then the 
integrity of the message is confirmed. AH uses a Hash Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC) with two key hashes. Examples of keyed hash algorithms for point-to-point 
are HMAC-MD5 and HMAC. Another common MAC algorithm is Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Block Chaining MAC (AES-XCBC-MAC96). There 
are many different strategies being developed for multicast connections (Guide to IPsec 
VPNs, NIST. 2005. RFC 4301, 2005. RFC 4302, 2005). 
The AH header consists of six different fields, next header, payload length, reserved, 
security parameters index, sequence number and authentication information. Some of 
these are self-explanatory and some are more complex. The Security Parameters Index 
(SPI) is a unique identifier for the connection. It is used by the recipient in combination 
with destination IP and IPsec protocol type to determine which Security Association 
(SA) is being used. Figure 3 depicts the different fields found in a AH header. 
 
Figure 3. The Authentication Header building blocks (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 
2005). 
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A connection consists of two one way connections. The sender and the receiver have 
their own SPI values corresponding to their connections. Each packet is assigned an 
incrementing sequence number, this provides defense against replay attacks and denial 
of service attacks. The actual HMAC value, which is used for integrity checking by the 
recipient, is located in the authentication information (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 
2005. RFC 4301, 2005. RFC 4302, 2005). 
Figure 4 shows the whole packet if a AH were to be added to a PING request (Guide to 
IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005). 
 
Figure 4. ICMP echo request (PING) with a AH providing for integrity. 
Encapsulation Security Payload 
ESP provides for integrity and data origin authentication which together are called 
integrity. Because ESP is connectionless it is provided on a packet-to-packet basis. 
Integrity calculations are done for each packet. Therefore the data origin is 
authenticated. The original ESP only provided confidentiality by encrypting the 
payload. ESP still provides this feature alongside the added integrity. ESP can provide 
integrity and confidentiality separately and therefore there is three different service 
combinations; confidentiality only, integrity only, and confidentiality and integrity 
(RFC 4301, 2005. RFC 4303, 2005) 
ESP has two different modes. It can operate in tunnel mode and in transport mode. In 
tunnel mode a new IP header is attached, which carries a destination address, usually a 
security gateway. The inner IP header stays unchanged and is the ultimate destination 
for the packet. ESP allows mixed inner and outer IP versions i.e. IPv6 over IPv4 or IPv4 
over IPv6. In tunnel mode the whole inner IP packet is secured by ESP. Figure 5 depicts 
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an ESP packet in tunnel mode.
 
Figure 5. ESP tunnel mode packet (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005). 
 
In transport mode the ESP is inserted after the IP header, leaving it unprotected. When 
combining ESP and AH in IPv4, the ESP will be placed after the IP header and before 
any next level protocol. AH, if present, will then apply to the ESP header, to the 
payload, to the ESP trailer, and to the Integrity Check Value (ICV). In Figure 6 is an 
ESP packet in transport mode illustrated. 
 
Figure 6. ESP transport mode packet (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005). 
If IPv6 is used the ESP header is placed after the hop-by-hop, routing, and 
fragmentation extension headers. Due to the IPv6 protocol features, destination options 
and extension headers might be inserted before, after or both before and after the ESP 
header. It is preferable to have them after the ESP header, since ESP only protects fields 
found after the ESP header (RFC 4303, 2005). 
 The ESP applies symmetric cryptography to provide the encryption demanded by 
IPsec. Both the sender and the receiver use the same shared secret key to encrypt and 
decrypt the messages. The algorithms being used to encrypt data are block cipher 
algorithms. Such algorithms divide the data that is to be encrypted into smaller blocks. 
These blocks are then encrypted in many rounds using the key. Every ESP header 
contains a SA field that among other things contains the specified algorithm. This is 
important, since packets might arrive in different order or be dropped. For decryption 
the same key is used and the process is repeated but in reverse direction. Examples of 
block cipher algorithms used by ESP are AES Code Block Chaining (AES-CBC), AES 
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Counter Mode (AES-CTR), and Triple Data Encryption Standard (DES) (3DES) (RFC 
4303, 2005. Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005).  
An ESP consists of the ESP header, the payload, and the ESP trailer. The Header 
consists of two fields, a SPI field and a sequence number. Both are used the same way 
as in the AH.  
The payload part of the packet contains the encrypted data and its Initialization Vector 
(IV). The IV is different for each packet and is used for encryption. Therefore, 
encrypting the same data will result in different payloads. This is an essential feature to 
protect against cryptanalysis. 
The ESP trailer consists of three fields, padding, padding length and next header. 
Padding is used for three reasons. First use is to make the encrypted data an integral 
multiple of the block size. Second use is to make sure that the ESP trailer ends on a 
multiple of 4 bytes. Last use is to conceal the actual length of the payload. The Padding 
length is a mandatory field holding the size of the padding field. Next header is used in 
the same way as in AH. It is a value telling the type of the next heading. 
Figure 7 depicts the ESP packet diagram and how it is constructed of different parts. 
• SPI identifies the security parameters in combination with IP address. 
• Sequence number. A monotonically increasing number, used to prevent replay 
attacks. 
• Payload data. The data to be transferred. 
• Padding. Used with some block ciphers to pad the data to the full length of a 
block. 
• Pad size. Size of padding in bytes. 
• Next header. Identifies the protocol of the payload data. The value of this field is 
chosen from the set of IP Protocol Numbers defined in the most recent 
“Assigned Numbers” RFC from the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. 
• Authentication data. Contains the data used to authenticate the packet. 
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Figure 7. The ESP packet diagram shows how an ESP packet is constructed and 
interpreted (RFC 4303, 2005). 
Internet Key Exchange  
The purpose of IPsec is to provide confidentiality, data integrity, access control, and 
data source authentication. These services are provided by maintaining a shared state, a 
security association, between the communication peers. This state defines, among other 
things, the specific services provided to the datagram, which cryptographic algorithms 
will be used to provide the services, and the keys used as input to the cryptographic 
algorithms. To establish this shared state in a manual fashion is not realistic. Internet 
Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) does this dynamically, IKEv2 replaces the three 
documents, RFCs 2407, 2408, and 2409, which define IKEv1 (RFC 4306, 2005). 
The goal of IKE is to set up a shared state, a security association or simply SA. IKE 
implements mutual authentication for the two communication hosts. When the hosts are 
authenticated, a SA can be established. The content of a SA is shared secret information 
that can be used for efficient implementation of ESP and/or AH. The SA also holds a set 
of cryptographic algorithms that enables the SA to secure its information content (RFC 
4306, 2005). 
Internet Key Exchange version 1 
This will only be a brief presentation of IKEv1 since it is deprecated by the newer 
IKEv2. IKEv1 is however still being used in legacy software since software older than 
2005 is still being used. For more information regarding the IKEv1 refer to RFC 2409 
and the Guide to IPsec VPNs (NIST, 2005). 
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IKEv1 exchanges are defined in two phases, IKE phase 1 that creates an IKE SA and 
IKE phase 2 that creates an IPsec SA in the channel protected by the IKE SA (Guide to 
IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005). 
IKE phase 1 has two modes, main mode and aggressive mode. Main mode negotiates 
the establishment of IKE SA with three pairs of messages. Aggressive mode uses only 
three messages and is therefore not as reliable but faster. The IKE SA created is 
bidirectional, providing protection for both sides (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005). 
IKE phase 2 has only one mode, quick mode, which uses three messages to establish an 
IPsec SA. The IPsec SAs created are unidirectional meaning that one SA is needed in 
each direction. All communication done in phase 2 is protected by an IKE SA (Guide to 
IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005).   
Internet Key Exchange version 2 
IKEv2 works with messaging between the pairs. It is always on the requester’s 
responsibility to ensure reliability. The message flow is also always initiated by the 
initiator by sending a request which is followed by a response from the responder. If 
there is no response received within a time interval, the initiator must resend its message 
or terminate the communication (RFC 4306, 2005).  
First request/response message pairs between the communicating peers are 
IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUT. IKE_SA_INIT negotiates cryptographic algorithms, 
exchanges cryptographic nonces and executes a Diffie-Hellman key-exchange. An 
IKE_AUTH exchanges identities and certificates. It also establishes the first 
CHILD_SA. These messages are partly encrypted and integrity protected to hide the 
identities of communicating hosts and to authenticate all other data fields in the 
exchange. The encryption keys used are set up by the previous IKE_SA_INIT 
messages. IKE_AUTH also authenticates the IKE_SA_INIT payload (RFC 4306, 
2005). 
The exchange could look like this (RFC 4306, 2005): 
1. The initator sends four packets containing different data. The first packet 
contains its header containing security parameter indexes, version numbers, and 
various flags. The second packet contains its security association initiator data 
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that holds information of which algorithms the initiator supports for the 
IKE_SA. The third packet contains Diffie-Hellman values, and the last packet 
contains a nonce. 
2. The responder chooses one of the suggested algorithm suites presented by the 
initiator for IKE_SA, completes the Diffie-Hellman exchange and sends a 
nonce. 
After these two steps both the initiator and the responder can generate a SKEYSEED, 
from which all keys for the IKE_SA will be derived. The keys will be used for 
encryption and integrity protection. There are also other keys derived from the 
SKEYSEED, for example keys for creating CHILD_SAs (RFC 4306, 2005). 
When all keys are derived and set up, the initiator sends an encrypted and integrity 
protected packet containing identification, certificates and certificate requests, security 
association request and traffic selectors. The responder answers with its identity 
identification, certificates if they have been requested, and completes the CHILD_SA 
negotiation (RFC 4306, 2005).   
2.1.2 IPsec in VPN scenarios 
IPsec can be used in many different ways to provide the protection required by different 
implementations. For VPN IPsec is used to provide authentication, encryption and 
integrity. In both scenarios the communication is set up by IKE and protected by 
IKE_SA, when an IPsec tunnel is set up for the VPN traffic. Most common setups for 
VPN are gateway-to-gateway and host-to-gateway. Gateway-to-gateway provides a 
secure IPsec communication link between networks. Host-to-gateway uses IPsec client 
software on the host. The connection is set up between the host and a gateway to 
provide a secure IPsec connection from any connection point in the Internet.  
Gateway-to-gateway 
This configuration is used to set up a secure IPsec communication link for a VPN 
between gateway A and gateway B. User A is inside network A where also gateway A 
is located. User B is inside network B and gateway B is also located there.  
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The communication flow, as described by (Guide to IPsec VPNs, NIST. 2005): 
1. User A sends regular packets to user B. 
2. Network A routes packets to gateway A 
3. Gateway A alternates the source IP of the packet by NAT. 
4. Gateway A matches the packets to its Security Policy Database (SPD) and 
determines that they are to be protected by ESP and also determines the address 
of the destination gateway. If SPD has no pointer to any IKE SA the gateway 
knows that there is no current IKE SA to protect the particular traffic. 
5. Gateway A initiates with gateway B an IKE SA negotiation that will result in an 
IKE SA. 
6. Gateway A wants to establish an ESP connection with gateway B. Gateway A 
uses parameters set in IKE SA to initiate an IPsec SA negotiation. All 
communication is protected by the IKE SA. The gateways will use ESP tunnel 
mode that will provide encryption and integrity. The result of the negotiation is 
two unidirectional IPsec SAs, one in direction A to B and one in direction B to 
A.  
7. Upon completion of the IPsec SA setup gateway A can finish processing the 
packets from user A. The packets will be processed according to the SA 
parameters. This includes adding an IP header to the packets with gateway A as 
source IP and gateway B as destination, encrypting the data and adding the 
authentication parameters. Then the packets are sent from gateway A to gateway 
B.  
8. Gateway B receives the packets and uses the unencrypted SPI values to 
determine which SA to be used. Gateway B processes the packets according to 
the right SA and validates the content. When the additional IP header has been 
removed, the integrity has been checked, and the payload has been decrypted, a 
packet will be sent to the original destination address which is user B. 
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If user B wants to reply and the IPsec SA is maintained then steps 7 and 8 are 
repeated for user B. If an IPsec SA is not maintained then the whole process is 
repeated. 
Host-to-gateway 
The scenario is the same as the gateway-to-gateway scenario: user A wants to send 
packets to user B in a different network. The difference is that user A is in a network 
without a VPN gateway, for example a public network. User B is inside a corporate 
network and a gateway B provides a VPN connection point. User A must now 
instead of having a gateway to establish and negotiate the IPsec SA have IPsec 
software running locally.  
1. User A sends regular packets to user B. 
2. IPsec of user A matches the packets to its SPD and determines that they are to 
be protected by ESP and also determines the address of the destination gateway. 
In SPD there is no pointer to any IKE SA. The IPsec software therefore knows 
that there is no current IKE SA to protect the particular traffic. 
3. IPsec software of user A initiates with gateway B an IKE SA negotiation that 
will result in an IKE SA. 
4. User A IPsec software wants to establish an ESP connection with gateway B. 
User As IPsec software uses parameters set in IKE SA to initiate IPsec SA 
negotiations. All communication is protected by the IKE SA. The ESP tunnel 
mode will be used to provide encryption and integrity. The result of the 
negotiation is two unidirectional IPsec SAs one in direction A to B and one in 
direction B to A.  
5. Upon completion of the IPsec SA setup IPsec software of user A can finish 
processing the packets from user A. The packets will be processed according to 
the SA parameters. This includes adding an IP header to the packet with IPsec 
software of user A as source IP and gateway B as destination, encrypting the 
data, and adding the authentication parameters. Then the packet is sent from 
IPsec software of user A to gateway B.  
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6. Gateway B receives the packets and uses the unencrypted SPI values to 
determine which SA to be used. Gateway B processes the packets according to 
the correct SA and validates the content. When the additional IP header has been 
removed, the integrity has been checked, and the payload has been decrypted, 
the packet will be sent to the original destination address which is user B. 
If user B wants to reply and the IPsec SA is maintained, then steps 5 and 6 are 
repeated but according to suite user B. If an IPsec SA is not maintained, then the 
whole process is repeated. 
2.2 MOBIKE 
Mobile Internet Key Exchange (MOBIKE) is an extension of IKEv2 developed to add 
Mobility and Multihoming features to IKEv2. MOBIKE’s goal is to enable efficient 
management of IPsec and IKE security associations when a host is attached to the 
Internet by multiple interfaces or if a host changes its point of attachment to the Internet. 
Presently IKEv2 must negotiate its SA’s after any change of the network topology or 
interface. This is a process demanding a lot of calculations and can also include user 
interaction, for example asking the user to insert a Personal Identification Number (PIN) 
for a security token (RFC 4621, 2006).  
The problem with IKEv2 is that it assumes that the SA created in the execution of the 
protocol is between IP addresses of the peers. This means that only one IP address in 
each host can be used with the designated SA and IKEv2 protocol session. IPsec does 
not have any documentation describing, suggesting or allowing these pairs to be 
changed, elsewhere than in Network Address Translation Traversal (NAT-T) (RFC 
4621, 2006). 
2.2.1 MOBIKE features 
MOBIKE addresses this problem by suggesting itself to work on top of the IKEv2. All 
development in MOBIKE has to be done according to both IKEv2 (RFC 4306) and 
Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (RFC 4301). This way the security risks 
are minimized since they have already been taken in consideration the mentioned RFC 
documentation. MOBIKE does not try to be a full mobility protocol, provides no 
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rendezvous mechanism for simultaneous movement, and has no support for route 
optimization. These features are left out to other levels of the Open System 
Interconnection  (OSI) - model and to other protocols like Mobile IP. MOBIKE focuses 
solely on what two peers need in order to agree at IKEv2 level and what is required for 
interoperability. MOBKIE defines new message formats and processing of messages 
with the defined format. MOBIKE focuses on tunnel mode. Therefore, any application 
running inside a MOBIKE controlled IPsec tunnel might not even detect any movement 
since their IP remains the same. Only the headers of the tunnel IP addresses are changed 
according to any movement of a mobile node (MN). MOBIKE is suggested to be able to 
perform the following operations; 
• Inform the other peer about the peer address set 
• Inform the other peer about the preferred address 
• Test connectivity along a path and thereby detect an situation with no 
connection 
• Change the preferred address 
• Change the peer address set 
• Ability to deal with NAT devices 
All features are not supported in the current protocol (RFC 4621, 2006). 
2.2.2 MOBIKE scenarios 
MOBIKE functionality is described through three different scenarios; 
• Scenario one; break-before-make. This scenario addresses the problem with a 
peer already connected to an IPsec gateway and loosing the connection and after 
being unreachable connects through a new point of attachment, and there with a 
new IP address. MOBIKEs goal here is to continue to use the same SA that was 
used by the old point of attachment and prevent expensive renegotiation of the 
SA. 
• Scenario two; multihomed. This scenario deals with the issue of having more 
than one network interface for security, cost or some other reason. This scenario 
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is not for mobility use but is meant to preserve a connection if anything happens 
to the primary interface. 
• Scenario three; multihomed laptop. This scenario deals with a mobile node (ex: 
a laptop) having many different ways of staying connected, through wire, 
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), Bluetooth, or Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) or General Packet Radio Service (GPRS). 
All these are always available and depending on cost, throughput, and network 
availability are used when appropriate. MOBIKE does not consider in what way 
the preferred connection is determined. The issue is to keep the same SA for IP 
address changes and between different interfaces. Only the tunnel IP address in 
the IP packet header is changed so applications running inside the IPsec tunnel 
will stay unaffected and unknowing.  
All scenarios are basically the same. MOBIKE provides for the IPsec and IKEv2 SA’s 
to be changed and they don’t have to be renegotiated. For an illustration of how this is 
done see Appendix A (RFC 4621, 2006. RFC 4555, 2006).  
MOBIKE is an important part of making the commonly used IPsec more suitable for 
mobile implementations. MOBIKE and IPsec working on a mobile protocol like MIP 
provides a good platform for mobile VPNs. 
2.3 SSL/TLS 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) developed by Netscape and its successor TLS developed by 
IETF are cryptographic protocols providing security and data integrity. SSL/TLS is 
used to secure traffic over unsecure networks such as the Internet. SSL was first 
developed by Netscape in the nineties. In the end of the nineties IETF started a 
workgroup which tried to collect all individual SSL versions and features and make one 
protocol out of them, TLS. SSL/TLS is a well trusted, spread and used protocol for 
securing data over the Internet, presently used for e-mail, web browsing, instant 
messaging, Voice-Over-IP (VOIP), and VPN (G.Magnini, 2005. RFC 5246, 2008).  
28 
 
2.3.1 Building blocks of SSL/TLS 
SSL/TLS provides security and data integrity with two sub-protocols, the record 
protocol and the handshake protocol.  
Record Protocol 
Record protocol is a layered protocol that is used to encrypt and transmit data. The data 
is fragmented into blocks that are either left at their original size or optionally they can 
be compressed. The record protocol applies a MAC to the data, encrypts and transmits 
the result. The key used to encrypt data is negotiated by the handshake protocol. For a 
receiver the data is processed in the reverse direction. (RFC 5246, 2008).  
Handshake protocol 
The handshake protocol is responsible for negotiating a session. To create a session the 
handshake protocol starts with exchanging hello messages to agree on algorithms, 
exchange random values, and check for session resumption. After this is done, and no 
session is resumed, the necessary cryptographic parameters needed for the client and 
server to agree on a premaster secrete are exchanged. Moreover, the server and the 
client authenticate themselves by exchanging certificates. After authentication and 
agreement on a secret the actual master secret is generated from the premaster secret 
and the exchanged random nonces. After this, the handshake protocol terminates by 
passing the security parameters to the record protocol which uses them to verify that 
they have been negotiated between the server and the client without tampering (RFC 
5246, 2008).  
There are also other sub-protocols in use by SSL/TLS such as the alert protocol and the 
change cipher suite protocol. These are used for error and alert messaging and for 
changing cipher suite if necessary. A full handshake message flow is illustrated in 
Figure8. 
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Figure 8. Message flow of a full handshake. 
2.3.2 SSL/TLS in VPN scenarios 
When a SSL/TLS connection is negotiated, setup correctly, and verified, a tunnel is 
created from the client to the server. The tunnel provides security and data integrity. The 
tunnel created is most commonly known for securing Hypertext Transport Protocol 
(HTTP) traffic but can also be used for VPN. There are a few different VPN solutions 
based on SSL/TLS one which is OpenVPN. SSL/TLS based VPN software provides the 
same kind of security as IPsec VPN software provides, a key exchange similar to Diffie-
Hellman and encapsulation of the traffic, similar to ESP. There is no standard on how to 
implement SSL/TLS VPNs, OpenVPN will be presented more in detail in the practical 
part of the thesis work. All open source SSL/TLS VPN solutions have some common 
features; easy setup since they run in user space and not in kernel space, well tested 
security library since they utilize OpenSSL libraries, and not expensive and easy to 
manage because of open source.   
2.4 SSH – Secure Shell 
SSH is a network protocol that allows two network interfaces to connect to each other 
securely. SSH is widely used, the typical use of SSH is secure login to remote 
computers, secure file transferee (SFTP) and other security sensitive services. The 
architecture of SSH is defined in RFC 4251, 2006, but the earliest drafts dates back to 
mid-nineties.  
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SSH consists of three mayor protocols, the Transport Layer Protocol, the User 
Authentication Protocol and the Connection Protocol (RFC 4251, 2006). 
2.4.1 Transport Layer Protocol 
Transport Layer Protocol, provides for several features essential for the needed security: 
server authentication, confidentiality, and integrity.  When a SSH connection is initiated 
the Transport Layer Protocol is the first to be used. The Transport Layer Link uses for 
example a TCP/IP connection, to set up a link that the Authentication Protocol will use 
(RFC 4251, 2006).  
2.4.2 Authentication Protocol 
Authentication Protocol, authenticates the client to the server, this is done over the 
Transport Layer Link. The authenticity of a client can be proven for example with a 
password, or a key exchange. When the client is authenticated the Connection Protocol 
will run over it (RFC 4251, 2006). 
2.4.3 Connection Protocol 
Connection Protocol multiplexes the encrypted tunnel to several logical channels. These 
logical channels are the actual tunnels which can be used by the user through different 
application. Common applications using the tunnels are SSH tunneling, SFTP, X11 
forwarding and standard interactive secure shells. 
SSH has no built in mobile ability. If a SSH connection is to become mobile it has to be 
set up on a mobile connection. Because the simple usage and flexibility of SSH, setting 
up an SSH tunnel on a mobile connection is not too difficult. Furthermore, most 
mobility protocol implementations provide a way for legacy software to communicate 
through the mobile channel either in IPv4 or IPv6 mode. Since SSH supports both IPv4 
and IPv6 this is not a problem (RFC 4251, 2006). 
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2.4.4 SSH VPN Scenario  
Since SSH can authenticate both server and user as well as encrypt the data link it can 
be used for VPN. Using SSH for VPN can be done by using a tunnel secured with SSH 
to mount a remote directory.  There are different software components that deal with the 
issues regarding the mounting and how to make the mounted directory to show up as a 
real hard disk drive. However, they all have the same SSH carrier in common. Figure 9 
depicts a simple version of how a SSH tunnel is set up and used with SFTP to mount a 
remote directory as a local drive.  
 
Figure 9. SSH tunnel used to mount a remote directory. The tunnel is encrypted, and 
user and server are authenticated. 
SSH is a widely used and open standard. That’s why there are plenty of open source and 
commercial software implementations SSH and SFTP to mount remote directories. One 
of these implementations is Expand Drive for Windows which is commercial. There are 
also GVFS and SSHFS for Linux. (GNOME 2.22 Release Notes, 2008. SSH 
Filesystem)  
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3 MOBILITY PROTOCOLS 
There are many network protocols that can provide mobility. Two such protocols are 
MIP and HIP. These two are different in their architecture and work in different ways to 
provide mobility, multihoming, seamless roaming, and session persistence to the end 
user. MIP is a based on the IP protocol and MIPv6 is the newest MIP protocol. HIP is 
still a newer protocol and therefore security measures have been incorporated as an 
essential part of the protocol throughout the development. Mobile IP is today much 
more commonly used than HIP since both MIPv4 and MIPv6 are further developed. 
There is also much commercial software using the MIP protocol. HIP is still in the 
development phase but it has a lot of potential as a mobile protocol. Both protocols are 
still under development, since there is a continuous evolution in mobile communication 
and in expectations from mobile services.  
3.1 Mobile IP 
MIP is a proposed standard based on IP. MIP makes mobility transparent to applications 
and higher level protocols like Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) (C.E. Perkins 
1998)  
The MIP standard for IPv4 was first defined in RFC 2002 in 1996 and is therefore the 
oldest of the protocols regarding mobility examined in this thesis work. Despite the age 
it has little advantage over HIP regarding mobility, since both protocols are in a 
seamlessly never ending development stage. MIP is developed to give users the comfort 
of being mobile, to change their topological location in the Internet and to be connected 
to a wired, wireless or a cellular network which is public or private. MIP also tries to be 
transparent to IP so that legacy software and higher protocols don’t have to be changed. 
The technology MIP is using to provide mobility also introduces new terms and new 
functionality. MN, HA, Foreign Agent (FA) and Care-of Address (CoA), are basic 
concepts of MIP. 
A MN is a host or a router that changes its topological location in the Internet without 
changing its IP address. The MN can continue to communicate with any other node 
connected to the Internet with its constant IP address (C.E Perkins, 2002). 
33 
 
A HA is a router in the MN’s home network. A HA forwards datagrams to MNs and 
maintains information about the current location of each MN (C.E Perkins, 2002). 
A FA is a router in a MN’s visited network. A FA cooperates with the Home Agent to 
complete the delivery of the datagram to the MN. FAs as routers are not needed in 
MIPv6, but FA is still a key element in understanding the concept of MIP (C.E Perkins, 
2002). 
A HA is an IP address that the MN is assigned for a longer period of time. This IP stays 
unchanged regardless of where in the Internet the MN is attached (C.E Perkins, 2002). 
CoA, an IP address reflecting the MNs current point of attachment, is the termination 
point of a tunnel towards the MN. There are two types of CoA: one is the address of the 
FA the MN is registered to, and the other type is the address the MN has obtained for 
one of his network interfaces in the foreign network (C.E Perkins, 2002). 
The basics setup and functionality are the same for both the IPv4 and IPv6 versions of 
MIP. MIP allows the MN to have two IP addresses, the static home address used to 
identify TCP connections, and the CoA which is the actual topological location. To 
separate these two in the described way gives the MN a constant address that it can be 
reached on by any other node in the Internet. Upon the scenario that the MN is in a 
foreign network the HA will have a record of MN’s actual attachment point CoA. This 
record is continuously updated by the MN when it moves between different locations in 
the Internet. The MN always appears to be available for traffic since the HA receives all 
packets that are addressed to the MN’s home address. For the MN to be able to receive 
packets addressed to its interface associated with its HA, the HA must redirect or tunnel 
the packet to the MN’s CoA. At the termination point of the tunnel the packets will be 
unpacked so that the MN will receive the packets using its interface associated with its 
static HA. When the MN answers to a node which is communicating with the MN 
through the HA - CoA tunnel, the MN simply sends its packets directly to the other 
node and with its interface associated with its HA as sender. This type of asymmetric 
routing is called triangle routing. The Corresponding Node (CN) will talk to the MN’s 
home address not knowing if the MN is actually in its home network, in a foreign 
network or if it is moving between different networks. Triangle routing can in some 
cases be exceptionally inefficient and add unnecessary delay. To avoid this, route 
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optimization extension is suggested to the basic MIPv4 and is already implemented in 
MIPv6 (C.E Perkins, 2002.). 
3.1.1 Mobile IPv6 and MEXT 
To be able to take advantage of new features such as multihoming and network mobility 
the switch to MIPv6 is inevitable. MIPv6 has its own workgroup under IETF and the 
description of the group states “Mobile IPv6 specifies routing support which permits an 
IPv6 host to continue using its home address as it moves around the Internet, enabling 
continuity of sessions. Mobile IPv6 supports transparency above the IP layer, including 
maintenance of active transport level sessions. In addition, network mobility (NEMO) 
mechanisms built on top of Mobile IPv6 allow managing the mobility of an entire 
network, as it changes its point of attachment to the Internet. The base specifications 
consist of: RFC 3775 (Mobile IPv6), RFC 3963 (NEMO), RFC 4877 (Mobile IPv6 
Operation with IKEv2)”. 
The main differences between MIP4 and MIPv6 which are important in this B.Sc. are 
(RFC 3775. 2004. draft-ietf-mext-rfc3775bis-03.txt. 2009 ): 
• There is no need to deploy special routers as FAs, as in MIPv4. MIPv6 operates 
in any location without any special support required from the local router. 
• MIPv4 route optimization has to be done by a nonstandard set of extensions but 
MIPv6 has support for route optimization as a fundamental part of the protocol. 
MIPv6 route optimization can operate securely even without pre-arranged SAs. 
It is expected that route optimization can be deployed on a global scale between 
all MNs and correspondent nodes. Support is also integrated into MIPv6 for 
allowing route optimization to coexist efficiently with routers that perform 
"ingress filtering”. 
• Most packets sent to a MN while away from home in MIPv6 are sent using an 
IPv6 routing header rather than IP encapsulation, reducing the amount of 
resulting overhead compared to MIPv4. 
• MIPv6 is decoupled from any particular link layer, as it uses IPv6 neighbor 
discovery instead of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). This also improves the 
robustness of the protocol. 
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• The use of IPv6 encapsulation and the routing header, removes the need in 
MIPv6 to manage "tunnel soft state". 
The MIPv6 supports multiple CoA and may obtain new addresses by stateless or 
stateful address auto configuration, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Version 6 
(DHCPv6). These features are of great use in cellular wireless environments where a 
MN can be reachable through multiple links at the same time. The MN will only 
register one CoA to the HA and by registering its primary CoA it will keep itself 
reachable. Upon link change, i.e. the current cell’s signal is weaker then another 
reachable cell’s signal, the MN advertises its new primary CoA to the HA with a 
binding update message, but keeps accepting packets on its old CoA for as long the as 
the old link is reachable or for other determined time (RFC 3775. 2004. draft-ietf-mext-
rfc3775bis-03.txt. 2009 ). 
In combination with not having a FA in MIPv6, all above mentioned features enable 
MIPv6 to conduct smoother handovers between networks, to be a more robust protocol, 
to have better security for the HA advertisement, and to have less bandwidth overhead 
than MIPv4.  
3.2 VPN over MIP 
MIP was originally an extension to the existing IP. This means that it is not in any way 
cryptographic on its own. Even though there has been a lot of development and 
extensions done for the MIPv6, it is also just an unprotected way of transporting IP 
packets to MNs located inside or away from the home network. To add the 
authentication and encryption demanded to set up a VPN connection some software for 
authentication and data encryption has to be used. There are three different methods for 
authentication and data encryption approved by the VPN consortium. Two methods 
utilize IPsec, IPsec with encryption and IPsec inside L2PT. IPsec with encryption in 
either tunnel or transport mode is the most used method and supports all requirements 
for a VPN connection. The security associations can be set up by IKE/IKEv2 or 
manually. IPsec and IKE/IKEv2 are also well described in many RFC documents, IPsec 
and L2TP (Layer two Tunneling Protocol) are described in RFC 3193.   
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3.2.1 MIP and IPsec 
IPsec with encryption is one method of setting up a VPN connection over Mobile IP. As 
Mobile IP keeps track of and forwards packets to the MN, the VPN software must 
provide application persistence and roaming. There are commercial software packets 
providing their own solutions based on MIP and IPsec. Since such software is 
commercial there is no open documentation on how roaming and persistence are 
implemented, only promises that these features are implemented. 
3.2.2 VPN scenario, MIPv4 with two HAs 
The Secure Universal Mobile (SUM) architecture and RFC 5265 both address the 
problems described in RFC 4095 (Problem Statement: Mobile IPv4 Traversal of Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) Gateways). The solution presented here which is based on the 
SUM architecture solves the problem more loosely than the defined solution in 
RFC5265 which strictly follows the outlined solution restrictions and methods in 
RFC4095. The SUM network setup proposes the same network setup as defined in 
RFC5265, which suggests the usage of two HA and a De-Militarized Zone (DMZ). This 
architecture is proposed to support seamless roaming throughout heterogeneous wireless 
networks both internally and externally. The functionality of the SUM architecture is 
examined in the following chapter. 
Architectural overview 
The SUM architecture uses two HA’s. One HA is placed in the internal private network 
and the other is placed in the DMZ. Through this new architecture SUM hopes to;  
• Maintain secure reachability to the Intranet by the MN. 
• Provide similar security that the user would have inside the private network. 
• Provide session continuity for the MN to minimize handoff delays and transient 
data loss. 
• Enable dynamic VPN-tunnel management, so that the MN can communicate on 
the most cost effective way in terms of security needed and network overhead. 
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Figure 10 shows a traditional network layout. Figure 10 can be compared to the SUM 
architecture in Figure 11. Figure 11 shows the SUM network layout with Mobile IP as 
network layer protocol. 
 
Figure 10. A traditional network layout. 
 
Figure 11. The SUM architecture on the same kind of network with Mobile IP as 
network layer protocol. 
The internal HA (i-HA) is used to support mobility in the internal network. The external 
HA (x-HA) supports the external mobility and ensures that the VPN session to the MN 
is kept alive, so that the MN seamlessly can change its topological position in the 
Internet. Two HA’s gives the MN two Home Addresses (i-HoA and x-HoA) and co-
located CoA (i-CoA and x-CoA). Each address is assigned by or communicates with the 
corresponding internal or external HA. The MN will have two instances of MIP 
running, one internal and one external corresponding to the above mentioned HoA and 
CoA. The notation for the internal is i-MIP and the external is x-MIP. The VPN address 
will be noted as TIA (Tunnel Inner Address). 
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Mobility 
The two key features SUM provides are seamless mobility and dynamic VPN-tunnels. 
The seamless mobility can be explained with the scenarios of the MN moving between 
the internal and external networks and vice versa, and by the MN moving around 
between different external networks. Whatever the case is, the roaming is to be done 
without breaking the VPN connection. For this to succeed four key steps has to be 
defined:  
• The MN registers its new x-CoA to x-HA. 
• A VPN tunnel is established inside the DMZ between the VPN gateway and the 
x-HoA. 
• The gateways end of the VPN tunnel is registered as the i-CoA with the i-HA. 
This allows the i-HA to tunnel packets sent to the i-CoA of the mobile device to 
be sent through a VPN tunnel to the VPN gateway. The VPN gateway will then 
tunnel the packets through the VPN tunnel and the x-MIP tunnel so it securely 
can reach the MN. 
• The last step is when the MN moves back into the private network. Then the 
MIP and VPN tunnels are dismounted and broken down since they are not 
necessary any more. This might generate some packet losses and delay time, but 
most applications nowadays have features to cope with this. 
Figure 12 shows how the different protocols are interacting in the SUM architecture. 
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Figure 12. Interaction of protocols for SUM using Mobile IP based architecture. 
One of the mayor concerns with seamless mobility is to minimize handoff delays and 
data loss in handoffs when the MN is roaming between networks. Therefore SUM 
utilizes handoff pre-processing and make-before-break strategies to reduce the impact of 
the delays and data loss. The MN will prepare itself beforehand to the change of 
networks. The rules for changing networks are not determined by SUM but they could 
theoretically be determined by the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), bandwidth, or cost of 
the visited and current network. When the MN assumes a change is eminent, 
preoperational steps are taken;  
• Activating its target interface in case of it being shut off when not used, 
• Obtaining the new IP-address and other IP-layer configurations, 
• Performing any authentication procedure required by the new network, and 
establishing the network connection needed. 
The concept of dynamic VPN tunnels was invented to reduce and remove network 
overhead and security risks produced by always-on VPN tunnels in mobile networks. 
The idea is to only set up VPN tunnels when they are needed; when the MN needs to 
contact/, or when it needs to be contacted by, or when it needs to access the Internet 
through/ -the internal network. The SUM way of implementing a dynamic VPN tunnel 
is to utilize the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for messaging between the CN inside 
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the local network and the MN. Two MIP tunnels are set up for SIP messaging, one 
between the i-HA to the x-HA and another between the x-HA to the MN. The MIP 
tunnels assure the CN and the MN that the SIP messages reach their destinations. The 
MIP tunnels are in this stage unprotected. For a CN to initiate a VPN tunnel a SIP 
INVITE is sent that is either processed by a SIP proxy or is intercepted by the i-HA. 
Either way the INVITE message is forwarded to the MN over the MIP tunnels. The MN 
checks if there is an already active VPN tunnel and if not IKE is used to set up a new 
VPN tunnel. The MN then uses the VPN tunnel to register the gateways end points to 
the i-HA as described earlier and depicted in Figure 12. Figure 13 illustrates the 
protocol interaction in a SUM architecture using SIP and Mobile IP.  
 
Figure 13. Interaction of protocols in SUM architecture with SIP. 
MIPv4, SUM with IKEv2  
SUM also proposes an alternative architecture utilizing IKEv2 mobility extensions, 
MOBIKE. The architecture using MOBIKE would eliminate the costly procedure of re-
establishing the VPN tunnel between the x-HA and the MN when the MN changes its 
IP. This architecture would also reduce the overhead created by the i-MIP, IPsec, and x-
MIP triple tunnel described in Figure 14. The key advantage of using MOBIKE is that it 
can modify the current VPN tunnel SAs and update its endpoint IP address without 
renegotiation. This feature renders the x-MIP tunnel useless and therefore reduces the 
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overhead. However, MOBIKE cannot provide by itself seamless mobility when moving 
between the internal and the external environment. Figure 14 shows the network layout 
as described using MOBIKE, Mobile IP and SIP. 
 
Figure 14. Implementation of the SUM architecture with MIP and SIP. 
3.3 HIP 
The motivation for HIP and host identities is that a new namespace is needed, since IP 
addresses are used both as topological locators and as network interface identifiers. The 
double use of the IP namespace makes mobility very inflexible and unsuitable.  
Host identity namespace is a new namespace that will decouple and interoperate with 
the already existing namespaces IP and DNS. A name in the Host Identity namespace is 
a Host Identifier (HI), which is a globally unique name that can be assigned to any 
system with an IP stack, but is not limited to only IP. A host is neither limited to only 
one HI. A HI is preferably a public key of a ‘public/private key pair’ and should also be 
initially authenticated with Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) or 
some other third party authenticator (R. Moskowitz & P. Nikander, 2008. RFC4423, 
2006). 
The Host Identity decouples the topological locator from the interface identifier. In 
practice this means that the IP addresses are used only to route packets and the network 
socket is bound to the Host Identifier referring to a single Host Identity. The decoupling 
of the internetworking and transport layer will also allow the layers to evolve 
independently. The HI can also be used as a host authenticator since it is a public key, 
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which can be utilized in authentication by other security protocols such as IPsec. Figure 
15 depicts how the new layer is supposed to be introduced to. (R. Moskowitz & P. 
Nikander, 2008. RFC4423, 2006).   
 
Figure 15. The new Host Identity layer is introduced to the OSI model to decouple the 
transport layer from the IP layer (InfraHIP Project: Intro, 2009). 
A HI is never used directly in the Internet to identify a host, HIs are only used in the 
HIP Base Exchange. To identify hosts a cryptographic hash is applied to the individual 
HI to create a 128-bit Host Identity Tag (HIT). The length is fixed because of 
conveniences for easier protocol coding and for being able to present a consistent 
format independent of what cryptographic algorithm is being used. A 128-bits 
cryptographic hash is allocated from the individual HI. Local Scope Identifiers (LSI) is 
another way of identifying a HI. The LSI is a 32-bit localized representation for a HI. 
The LSI serves as a bridge for Host Identities into IPv4 based protocols and application 
programming interfaces (API). LSIs are not globally unique due to their insufficient 
length (R. Moskowitz & P. Nikander, 2008. RFC4423, 2006). 
The cryptographic nature of the HIs is suitable for many authentication systems but a 
new protocol, HIP is introduced. Older authentications methods such as IKEv2 do not 
support middle boxes or mobility in the extent HIP can provide. HIP introduces a new 
cryptographic exchange, host identity Base Exchange. This new exchange enables the 
peers to set up SAs used by IPsec for setting up an end-to-end secure connection. The 
data traffic of this connection is secured by taking advantage of ESP packets. Presently, 
ESP is the best way to secure the payload in a datagram, but in the future better ways to 
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secure data will surely be developed. HIP also adds multi-homing and mobility features 
to the enabled HIP devices (R. Moskowitz & P. Nikander. 2008). 
The practical set-up of HIP is basically two roundtrip Diffie-Hellman key exchanges, a 
Base Exchange, and some additional messages. The Base Exchange is done to confirm 
that two peers actually have own private keys corresponding to own HIs, which are 
public keys. When a host is authenticated the Base Exchange sets up two SAs to enable 
the end-to-end security of ESP enveloping. If two hosts need more than two parallel 
SAs they should use separate HITs for setting up the communication channel. The Base 
Exchange is illustrated in Figure 16. (R. Moskowitz & P. Nikander. 2008).  
         
Figure 16. HIP Base Exchange from the initial contact to transmission of the first ESP 
protected message is sent, as proposed (InfraHIP Project: Intro, 2009). 
The flow of the Base Exchange can be described in the following steps (InfraHIP 
Project: Intro, 2009):  
Initiator --> Directory: lookup Responder 
Initiator <-- Directory: return Responders's address and HI/HIT 
I1    Initiator --> Responder (Hi, Here is my I1, let's talk with HIP) 
R1   Responder --> Initiator (Ok, Here is my R1, handle this HIP cookie) 
I2    Initiator --> Responder (Computing, here is my counter I2) 
R2   Responder --> Initiator (OK. Let's finish HIP with my R2) 
Initiator --> Responder (ESP protected data) 
Responder --> I (ESP protected data)  
44 
 
A node is mobile when it can change its topological location in the Internet. Changing 
the location also means that the IP address is changed. A node is multihomed when it 
has more than one simultaneous connection to the Internet. The node has multiple 
routes for incoming and outgoing traffic using different interfaces. (HIP Implementation 
for FreeBSD, 2005). Because the SAs are not bound to IP addresses, a host node is able 
to receive HIP created ESP SA packets from any IP address. A node can change its 
topological location and continuously send and receive packets to and from its peers 
(InfraHIP Project: Intro, 2009).  
3.3.1 VPN over HIP 
To use HIP as the transport protocol for VPN provides a secure and easy way to a 
mobile VPN. HIP supports multihoming, which is an essential part for the so called 
road warrior. A road warrior is a remote user who accesses the corporate intranet from 
various locations in the Internet. This has traditionally been done with various tunneling 
methods, such as PPTP or L2TP over IPsec (P. Nikander, 2004). Unfortunately these 
protocols or combinations of protocols produce a large network overhead and by 
themselves do not support multi-homing. Therefore they are not suitable for mobile use. 
The traffic efficiency is critical since mobile devices often connect to the Internet 
through GPRS or 3G/UMTS networks and extra overhead is costly for the end user. For 
the session not to be reinitialized every time the network attachment is changed, the 
multihoming ability is a key feature for mobile VPN implementations.  
3.3.2 HIP Proxy 
As a result of the HIP Base Exchange, a HIP connection can provide similar security as 
IPsec without IKE. Therefore placing a HIP proxy between a private network and the 
Internet will provide the security needed for a VPN connection. The proxy can of course 
be placed in a public network as well but then the reason to use it is lost. The security 
can be maintained all the way between HIP enabled host via the proxy to the legacy host 
if the HIP proxy secures the connections from itself to the legacy hosts in some other 
way, for example with Secure Shell (SSH) or IPsec. 
For a network and a HIP enabled host to work with a HIP proxy the HIP proxy and the 
HIP enabled host must set up a connection. This is done by configuring the HIP enabled 
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host to use the HIP proxy as shown in Figure 17. When the HIP enabled host and the 
HIP proxy sets up a connection, the Base Exchange is done, and the SA for ESP is 
created, then this HIP enabled host can send ESP protected packets to the HIP proxy. 
The proxy unpacks the ESP packets to IP packets and sends them to the legacy host. 
When the legacy host answers to the HIP host with a IP packet then the HIP proxy 
envelopes it in an ESP packet and sends it to the HIP enabled host. For a host-to-host 
HIP secured connection also the legacy hosts must change their OSI stacks to support 
HIP. 
 
Figure 17. The setup for a HIP proxy between a private network and the Internet. 
It is also a cost efficient solution to give all legacy hosts in a private network the ability 
to access HIP hosts outside the private network through the proxy, since in the private 
network all hosts are automatically considered to be secure and trusted. All 
communication in the private network is therefore by itself secure. The proxy can also 
be used the other way round so that a HIP enabled host from the Internet can access the 
inside of the private network. This requires the proxy to store a record of trusted HITs 
and HIs that are allowed to access the intranet (Patrik Salmela and Jan Melén. 2006). 
3.3.3 Overlay Convergence Architecture for Legacy Applications 
Overlay Convergence Architecture for Legacy Applications (OCALA) is a generic 
proxy that can be used as a HIP proxy. OCALA introduces a new layer called Overlay 
Convergence (OC) to the OSI stack, layered under the transport layer. The OC layer 
bridges legacy applications and overlays (HIP). The OC provides an IP like interface to 
the legacy applications and then tunnels the traffic over the overlays. The OC is divided 
into a OC-I sub-layer and a OC-D sub-layer. The OC-I providing the IP like interface to 
the legacy applications and the OC-D that is communicating with the overlay. The 
overlay consists of modules that implement different protocols for tunneling purposes, 
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protocols such as HIP, i3, RON and other. The overlay provides a way to implement 
any protocol through the OC-D sub-layer. Figure 18 illustrates the two sub layers and 
their relation to the Transport layer and the different plug-ins (OCALA - Overlay 
Convergence Architecture for Legacy Applications. 2006). 
 
Figure 18. The OCALA architecture, OC layer is placed under the transport layer. 
OCALA Proxy 
OCALA can be used as a proxy for the different overlay protocols, giving legacy host 
the ability to benefit from the overlay protocols features. The proxy must be 
implemented in a secure way to benefit from the security features HIP can provide. 
A common scenario is that a legacy host running a legacy application inside a private 
network wants to communicate with a mobile host over HIP. The OCALA proxy 
provides an interface between the private network communicating with IP and the 
mobile host communicating with HIP as depicted in Figure 19. The OCALA proxy 
tunnels the IP packets through the overlay HIP module. The mobile HIP host receives 
the packets and supplies the legacy host through the IP like interface OC-I provides. 
The result is that the legacy software on the legacy host inside the private network can 
communicate over HIP with a mobile host’s legacy software unaware of the OCALA 
proxy. This scenario is also working the other way around, with the mobile host 
communicating with hosts inside the private network (OCALA - Overlay Convergence 
Architecture for Legacy Applications. 2006). 
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Figure 19. A legacy host running a legacy application communicating with a mobile 
HIP host’s legacy application through a OCALA IP-HIP proxy. 
3.3.4 HIP VPN Gateway 
To enable a mobile host, a road warrior, to access a private network using HIP a HIP 
gateway implementation is preferable. A HIP gateway set up the correctly gives the 
road warrior the best HIP solution for accessing his private/corporate network. Legacy 
hosts inside a private network that wishes to communicate with a mobile HIP host, must 
know where in the Internet the MN is located. This can be implemented with a so called 
Rendezvous server (RSV). When the legacy host knows where in the Internet the MN is 
located it can either use a HIP proxy in its own private network or HIP installed locally 
for full HIP support. 
3.4 Theoretical conclusion 
The research on the theoretical background has provided a deeper knowledge in the 
examined protocols and technologies. The theoretical part is divided into two main 
chapters VPN Implementations and Mobility Protocols. All protocols and technologies 
examined in both chapters are suitable for mobile VPN implementations.  
The VPN part of the chapter examines the IPsec, MOBIKE and SSL/TLS protocols and 
their usage in VPN scenarios. They are all possible candidates for successful usage in 
mobile VPNs. IPsec with or without MOBIKE is suitable because of its already broad 
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usage in VPN implementations and its durability. SSL/TLS VPNs are suitable because 
of lightweight, small network overhead, ease-of-use, and also many features providing 
more personal and precise rules for users.  
The Mobility Protocol chapter examines MIPv4 and MIPv6 with more focus on version 
6 as well as HIP. Both protocols are developed with the mobility in mind and they are 
both theoretically good candidates for providing features desired in mobile 
environments. Multihoming, seamless roaming between networks, and continuous 
accessibility are features which these protocols offer the user. 
Theoretically, implementing these protocols and technologies correctly should provide 
mobile VPN with a high level of usability, security, performance, and mobility.  
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4 EVALUATION OF MOBILE VPN SOLUTIONS 
4.1 Birdstep SafeMove 
4.1.1 Overview 
Birdstep is an Scandinavian company founded in 1996 and with its headquarters in 
Oslo, Norway. Birdstep software SafeMove 5.0 is a Mobile VPN solution utilizing 
Mobile IP, IKE, and IPsec. SafeMove offers the end user seamless mobility, session 
persistence, and genuine .zero-click connectivity. The SafeMove software can  be 
installed on computers, smart phones and PDAs. 
4.1.2 Mobility 
BirdStep is using Mobile IP as the mobility protocol. BirdStep has implemented eleven 
RFC documents concerning Mobile IP.  Among other the RFC 3519 dealing with NAT 
traversal is implemented to deal with NAT traversal issues. BirdStep also supports 
thirteen different RFC standards dealing with VPN security, most of these deals with 
IKE versions one and two and IPsec. BirdStep has built a solution around IPsec and 
IKE. The used RFC standards are implemented to meet the mobility and security 
demands (Birdstep Technology Oy, 2009).  
For the SafeMove solution to work a client software has to be used by the MN. The 
client software is found for Windows, Linux and Apples OSx. This gives SafeMove an 
advantage, since most other Mobile VPN solutions are not as versatile. SafeMove 
architecture depends on a legacy server provided by BirdStep (Birdstep Technology Oy, 
2009).  
4.1.3 Conclusion 
BirdStep offers a complete Mobile IP solution with a lot of supported standards, which 
ensure that it will work well with legacy networks. However, BirdStep seems not to be 
willing to share any of the information regarding the network topology or other changes 
that have to be done to a network were the SafeMove solution is to be implemented. 
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Furthermore, BirdStep holds many patents regarding solutions for dealing with Mobile 
VPN (Birdstep Technology Oy, 2009). 
4.2 Cisco Mobile VPN  
4.2.1 Overview 
Cisco Systems released 2006 a whitepaper about a mobile VPN based on Mobile IP and 
Cisco Mobile Client software (Cisco Mobile VPN, 2006). Cisco utilizes the features 
that Mobile IP provides in own hardware and software. The end user can enjoy seamless 
mobility and session persistence, which in combination with IPsec result in a VPN 
connection. The white paper referees to RFC 2794 Mobile IP Network Access Identifier 
Extension for IPv4 from the year 2000. Cisco Mobile VPN uses MIP as specified in 
another white paper by Cisco Systems (Cisco Mobile IP, 2001). This white paper refers 
to one of the earliest RFC’s concerning mobile IP (RFC 2002, 1996). However, it is 
assumable that Cisco has updated own standards along the way to support newer 
versions of the MIP protocol.  
To add seamless mobility, Cisco Mobile VPN interacts with the client’s network 
hardware to retrieve information about signal strength. The client software uses this 
information to determine if the signal strength is under a certain threshold. If the signal 
is low, the client software sets up an alternative connection and prepares itself to switch 
if the signal strength falls under a second threshold. The threshold may be set to other 
parameters than signal strength e.g. to cost, bandwidth, or it can be manually 
configured. 
4.2.2 Network scenario 
Cisco Mobile VPN network setup is not too different from the standard Mobile IP 
network setup. Cisco uses a HA to route the packets to the MN and to keep track of the 
MN’s movement. However, Cisco Mobile VPN doesn’t use an separate FA as supposed 
for Mobile IPv4 networks. Instead Cisco has developed client software that has taken 
the FA’s place. This innovation gives the “road warrior” the desired uncomplicated 
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setup. Furthermore, an FA can also be introduced to this solution to increase scalability 
for the “road warriors” network.  
4.2.3 Cisco Mobile VPN specific configuration example 
 
Figure 20. Cisco Mobile IP VPN configuration Topology Example. 
There are some specific configurations that need to be considered for the Cisco Mobile 
IP VPN. Figure 20 depicts a network with Cisco Mobile VPN implemented: 
• HA addresses must be publicly accessible. This feature gives the MN the ability 
to move from the internal network to an external network. 
• In AAA authentication the IPsec gateway must permit UDP on port 1645. This 
is critical if the HA uses SA’s stored on an AAA server located inside the 
private network. 
• If NAT is used by the VPN gateway to assign the MN IP addresses and the MN 
needs to reach the Internet, then traffic from the MN would need to be NATed to 
the public IP address. 
• Mobile IP Reverse tunnel features must be enabled. This is done in order to 
bypass a potential Reverse Path Forwarding check. This feature is used in most 
ISP networks. 
• The IPsec tunnel must run on top of Mobile IP tunnels. No changes to the IPsec 
tunnel endpoint are done. 
52 
 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
The Cisco Mobile VPN solution seems like a solid Mobile VPN solution. The usability 
seems to be high since the only interaction demanded by the “road warrior” is to start up 
the client software and authenticate him/herself. Since this is a supplier specific 
solution, the network side seems to be solid and tested enough to meet the demands of 
what a mobile VPN environment is demanding. However, since this is a supplier 
specific solution it may require big investments for a organization to be able to 
implement it.  
4.3 IETF standard for Mobile IPsec VPN based on Mobile IPv4 
and MOBIKE 
The IETF document RFC 5266 outlines a mobile IPsec VPN solution based on Mobile 
IPv4 and MOBIKE. There is only one HA, an i-HA in the internal network, and only 
co-located care-of addresses (co-CoA) can be used in the external network. The 
resulting network topology is depicted in Figure. 21. A MN has thus only one instance 
of Mobile IP running, the internal i-MIP. 
 
Figure 21. Mobile IPsec VPN based on Mobile IPv4 and MOBIKE (R=router). 
When a MN is located in the internal network, the current i-CoA or FA-CoA is 
registered in the i-HA and the MN has only i-MIP running. The MN may have valid 
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IKEv2 SAs with the VPN gateway. An IPsec SA can be created when required. When 
the MN moves to a new network attachment point, then the following four steps are 
taken:  
- The MN obtains a co-located x-CoA or i-CoA from the local network.  
- At the same time, 
o a MOBIKE exchange to update SAs of an existing IPsec VPN 
connection with the new MN IP address is initiated. If no valid VPN 
connection exists, then an IPsec VPN connection between the new MN 
IP address and VPN gateway is established 
o the MN sends a Mobile IPv4 Registration Request to the i-HA without 
VPN encapsulation.  
- If the MN receives a Registration Reply, then the MN is located in the internal 
network and the MN can communicate without VPN tunneling.  
- If the MN receives no response to the Registration request and if a valid VPN 
tunnel exists, then the MN sends a Mobile IPv4 Registration Request to the i-
HA through the VPN tunnel. After receiving a Registration reply from the i-HA, 
the MN is ready for data communication through the VPN tunnel. 
After these four steps, IP packets sent to Home Address of the MN are tunneled through 
the VPN gateway to the MN. When the MN after this roams in the external network, 
then all four steps are needed each time the point of network attachment is changed. If 
the MN moves from the external network to the internal network, then only the three 
first steps are needed. 
Successful roaming behind, to or from behind a NAT gateway is achieved in the same 
way as for an IPsec VPN based on only Mobile IPv4. Depending on the MIP access 
mode used and possible placement of a NAT device, different NAT related problems 
are eminent. Different solutions to eliminate problems associated with NAT devices 
must be used. The problems are the same as with Mobile IPv4 without MOBIKE. 
4.4 Mobile IPsec VPN based on Mobile IPv6 
The mobile IPsec VPN solution based on Mobile IPv4 specified in the IETF document 
RFC 5265 also works for Mobile IPv6. The mobile IPsec VPN solution based on 
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Mobile IPv4 and MOBIKE specified in the IETF document RFC 5266 also works for 
Mobil IPv6 implementations with MOBIKE support. An open source IPsec 
implementation with MOBIKE support for both IPv4 and IPv6 is StrongSwan 
(www.strongswan.org). A difference in comparison with mobile IPsec VPN solution 
based on Mobile IPv4 is that a MN in Mobile IPv6 can have only co-located care-of 
addresses. The performance of IPsec VPN solutions based on Mobile IPv6 may 
however suffer from two instances of IPsec tunneling, since signal messages between a 
MN and it’s HA are IPsec protected. 
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5 PRACTICAL STUDIES 
5.1 Test environment and tools 
5.1.1 VMware Player 
VMware Player is free software for running virtual machines on a computer. VMware 
Player is developed by VMware Inc. which is the leading company for developing 
virtualization software. VMware offers a large software suite that covers a broad 
spectrum of tools used in virtualization. VMware Player is one of these tools.  
A virtual machine is isolated software simulating a real machine; such a machine can 
run its own operating system and applications as a real computer. A virtual machine has 
its own virtual hardware, everything from a Central Processing Unit (CPU), Random 
Access Memory (RAM) to network adapters and hard drives. A virtual machine 
behaves exactly as a real computer, applications and operating systems are unaware of 
running on software implemented hardware. Not even the virtual machine itself knows 
that it is virtual. These features and the fact that everything is running on virtual 
hardware are all things that are advantages over physical hardware. Such advantages are 
compatibility, isolation, encapsulation and hardware independence (Virtual Machines, 
Virtual Server, Virtual Infrastructure – VMware: Virtualization Basics, 2009).  
Compatibility, means that the virtualization software works with all x86 operating 
systems and all hardware found in a real computer. Any operating system or software 
that runs on a real computer runs also on a virtual component. 
Isolation, means that hardware of a computer running multiple virtual machines is 
shared but also isolated from the hardware use of other virtual machines. This means 
that if one of the virtual servers crashes, then this crash will not affect any other virtual 
machines. The crashed virtual server can be restarted and served while the other virtual 
machines are running normally. 
Encapsulation, means that a virtual machine is a package of software implemented 
hardware, an operating system, and applications. The package is portable and can be 
copied and moved to any other machine running VMware Player.  
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Hardware independence means that the virtual hardware is completely independent of 
the physical computer. The virtual hardware can be configured and tuned in any way 
and is not inflicting danger to the physical hardware. Hardware independence also 
enables portability of a virtual machine as long as the x86 architecture remains.  
VMware Player is used in this B.Sc. thesis project to test applications in a network, in 
which it is easy to switch between operating systems and between different 
configurations of programs and operating systems. 
5.1.2 Ubuntu 
Ubuntu is a community developed Linux distribution. Because of easy installation and a 
package manager, Ubuntu is one of the most used Linux distributions for personal 
computers. Ubuntu is a free of charge operating system providing versions suitable for 
different server applications and for regular desktop workstations. Ubuntu is available 
as long time service (LTS) versions or as regular versions. In both cases Ubuntu will 
always stay free of charge either you are installing a new version or upgrading an old. 
Ubuntu supports the best and newest software that the open source community provides 
with its easy-to-use package handler. Since the first release of Ubuntu in October 2004 
there have been many improvements. Development rate is still high. The goal is to 
achieve a new version release every 6 months (What is Ubuntu? | Ubuntu, 2009. The 
Ubuntu Story, 2009). 
Ubuntu is the chosen Linux distribution for this B.Sc. thesis project because it is easy to 
install, to manage, and to keep up to date. Ubuntu is also one of the most supported 
Linux distributions for ready built packages. These features make installation of 
components and programs easy. Moreover, there are never any compilation problems, 
since the packages are binaries.  
5.1.3 OpenVPN  
OpenVPN is an open source cross-platform SSL VPN solution with all features that any 
other competitive VPN solution provides. OpenVPN supports a wide range of 
configurations modes including remote access, site-to-site VPN, Wi-Fi security, 
enterprise-scale remote access with load balancing, failover, and fine-grained access 
57 
 
controls. OpenVPN is lightweight compared to other VPN solutions and is based on the 
well known and widely used SSL/TLS protocol providing security on the transport level 
of the OSI stack. OpenVPN provides a variety of authentication methods based on 
certificates, smartcards, and devices providing strong authentication i.e. two factors. 
Due to the variety of authentication methods, user specific and/or group specific access 
control policies can be implemented through firewall rules applied to the virtual 
interface created by OpenVPN (About OpenVPN,2009). 
OpenVPN is written as a user-space daemon, not as a kernel module as IPsec is 
implemented. The daemon running in the user space gives to OpenVPN an easy 
installation and configuration. As a premise states “complexity is the enemy of 
security”, the simplicity is a good thing. Running in user-space also makes OpenVPN 
easy to port and implement in different environments. OpenVPN uses an industrial 
strength security model designed to protect against both active and passive attacks. The 
model is based on SSL/TLS for session authentication and on the IPsec ESP protocol 
for secure tunnel transport over User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and TCP. OpenVPN 
does not support IPsec even if it uses the ESP protocol. There is also no support for 
IKE, PPTP or L2TP. OpenVPN is compatible with RSA certificates and X509 public 
key infrastructure (PKI), NAT, DHCP, and TUN/TAP virtual devices. OpenVPN is not 
a web application proxy, it is a full range VPN solution requiring installation on both 
server and client (About OpenVPN,2009). 
OpenVPN is used in this B.Sc. thesis project as VPN software because it is easy to 
install and use. OpenVPN is also available as binaries for Ubuntu. 
5.1.4 Wireshark 
Wireshark is a protocol analyzer and it is the leading of its kind. Wireshark is open 
source, and it has been under development since 1998 by security and network 
specialists from all over the world. A wide range of protocols are supported. Because 
Wireshark is open source it is possible to make own plug-ins for unsupported protocols. 
It has a good graphical user interface and runs on most operating systems. It also 
provides good tools for filtering, for saving output files, and for reading files in different 
formats (Whireshark: About, 2009).  
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HIP is a protocol that is not supported in the original Wireshark protocol suite. 
Wireshark must therefore be patched. To patch Wireshark is not a difficult process 
except for finding the right protocol plug-in version for the right Wireshark version (See 
Appendix B for a guide on how to patch Wireshark for HIP). 
Wireshark is used in this B.Sc. thesis project for analysis and verification of network 
activity corresponding to the anticipated behavior of different protocols. 
5.1.5 InfraHIP project 
InfraHIP 
InfraHIP is a project in HIIT. Infra stands for infrastructure addressing issues such as 
DNS, NAT and firewall support to make HIP a widespread protocol. HIP stands for 
Host Identity Protocol and the basic protocol is almost finished. InfraHIP studies 
application related aspects of HIP such as rendezvous service, operating system 
security, multihoming, process migration and issues related to enterprise level solutions. 
The project collaborates with Distributed System Group in RWTH Aachen (InfraHIP 
project: About, 2009). 
HIPL 
HIP for Linux or HIPL is the software developed by the InfraHIP project to provide an 
application base for the InfraHIP project. HIPL is experimental but well working 
software and relatively easy to setup and use. HIPL is easiest described with a couple of 
use case scenarios (InfraHIP Project: HIPL): 
• Security for different types of Internet connectivity. A TLS type of security is 
provided with support for both Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and 
UDP protocols. Legacy applications are not required to be changed to take 
advantage of the authenticity, confidentiality and integrity features provided by 
HIPL. 
• Public key based access control. A firewall module supporting and a graphical 
user interface for end users are provided to enable and make public key access 
control easier. 
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• Universal and persistent Internet connectivity. This feature makes it easy for end 
users to provide web services from behind a NAT without changing the NAT 
configurations. This feature also enables hosts to keep sessions alive while 
moving across different networks and points of attachment to the Internet. 
HIPL is used in this project because it is the most up-to-date implementation of HIP 
according to HIP related RFC documentation. It is also released as a binary for Ubuntu 
making it easy to install and use in an Ubuntu environment. HIPL and InfraHIP also 
provide good documentation, testing programs and scenarios, and possible 
implementation examples.  
5.2 Mobile VPN with HIP – practical testing 
5.2.1 InfraHIP and openVPN 
This test is done with HIP as the mobility protocol, and HIPL as the software providing 
HIP and OpenVPN as the VPN software. The test purpose is to determine if this 
combination of protocol and software will work, and how well it works considering 
mobility. The experiment is based on the fact that it is mentioned in the InfraHIP 
manual as a possible implementation of HIPL (OpenVPN Compatibility, 2009). 
Mobility will be tested by changing the Internet connection network interface. The 
assumption is that the session will not be dropped and no renegotiation of the HIP 
session will be necessary, as long there is at least one active network interface on the 
MN. The VPN connection is assumed to stay open all the time since both network 
interfaces will be active and both interfaces will be registered for usage. The same 
experiment will also be conducted with a delay between the switching of the network to 
determine how well it will work under a time-out scenario. The assumption is that the 
HIP session will be renegotiated, but that the VPN session is saved. 
The test is done with two computers in the same subnet, since the purpose is to test the 
concept and to see if it works. Thereby eliminating as many peripheral variables as 
possible is desirable. The two computers will be identified as Computer (A) and 
Computer (B), and their IP addresses are, 192.168.1.44, 192.168.1.42  and 
192.168.1.43. Computer (A) has the HIT 2001:0019:d7bd:d59c:fda4:eb6e:79fa:cb5b 
and Computer (B) 2001:001a:592b:6d45:0946:83e5:bfe8:6057. The test starts with 
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testing the concept by not including mobility. Depending on the success of the concept 
test the mobility test is executed. The results will be recorded. The OpenVPN 
configurations can be found in Appendix C. 
Some additional configuration is needed to get InfraHIP to use custom LSI’s, see 
configuration guide in Appendix D. After the additional configuration and startup of 
hipd and hipfw processes OpenVPN can be started. The tunnel interface will be using 
the addresses 10.8.0.2 for Computer(A) and 10.8.0.1 from  Computer(B). 
InfraHIP and OpenVPN proof of concept 
The proof of concept test was successful, the tunnel was set up using the configured LSI 
(1.0.0.50) for Computer(B). As shown in Figure 22 the tunnel is successfully set up 
using LSI of Computer(B). Figure 23 illustrates the packet by packet setup flow during 
the initialization of the tunnel. 
 
Figure 22. Computer(A), OpenVPN tunnel successfully initialized. Computer(B) LSI: 
1.0.0.50 . 
 
Figure 23. Computer(B), Wireshark log of the OpenVPN tunnel initialization. 
Computer(A) LSI: 10.0.0.51. 
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InfraHIP and OpenVPN – mobility 
The mobility test failed. Switching between network interfaces caused the VPN tunnel 
to stop working. However, the VPN tunnel did not crash because it could resume 
without renegotiation. This proves that InfraHIP makes the VPN tunnel mobile. 
Furthermore, since the mobility is proven to work without the hipfw process running, 
the assumption is that the hipfw is the process causing the mobility problem. However, 
the hipfw process needs to be running to add the LSI support needed by OpenVPN. 
5.2.2 InfraHIP and SSH 
Proof of concept and mobility of InfraHIP and SSH are tested. Computer (A) will 
mount a directory on Computer (B) over SSH inside a HIP tunnel. Computer (A) is 
identified by IP’s 192.168.1.44, 192.168.1.42 and HIT 
2001:001a:592b:6d45:0946:83e5:bfe8:6057. Computer(B)  is identified by IP 
192.168.1.43 and HIT 2001:0019:d7bd:d59c:fda4:eb6e:79fa:cb5b. Computer(B) HIT is 
added to the hosts file of Computer(A) for convenience. To easily see if there is any 
interruption in the transfer, a video is opened from the remotely mounted drive. The 
video has little significance in the proof of concept test. However, in the mobility 
testing it reveals if there is a problem with the handover between network interfaces on 
Computer(A) and if the update is done smoothly between the connected computers. 
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InfraHIP and SSH proof of concept 
The proof of concept test is just testing that InfraHIP and SSH work together as 
expected. Computer(A) connects to Computer(B) by the HIT of Computer(B). The 
software used to mount a drive over the network is built in for Gnome 2.5 and later 
versions. Both test computers are running Ubuntu 9.04 which has Gnome preinstalled. 
Figures 24 and 25 prove that the proof of concept test was successful. Figure 24 shows 
how the video is played from the remotely mounted hard drive unit. Figure 25 shows 
the encrypted data. 
 
Figure 24. The successful proof of concept test. In the picture; output from InfraHIP 
process, output from remote video, explorer showing the remote directory where the 
video is located.  
 
Figure 25. Successful proof of concept, SSH packets addressed with the HIT of 
Computer(A). 
The proof of concept test was successful, Computer(A) could mount a directory from 
Computer(B) as a local driver using HIT of Computer(B). 
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InfraHIP and SSH mobility – mobility 
Because of the successful proof of concept test, the same setup is tested for mobility. 
The mobility test is done in the same setup and environment. The only different is that 
now Computer(A) will be using both network interfaces. The network interface state is 
randomly changed from up to down and vice versa. This is done to simulate a road 
warrior changing between networks. The expected outcome is that the SSH tunnel 
always stays intact, while the HIP tunnel is changing between the interfaces of 
Computer(A). Also the scenario of both network interfaces being down will be tested.  
 
Figure 26. Wireshark dump showing successful update of address of Computer(A) from 
192.168.1.44 to 192.168.1.42. 
Figure 26 shows a successful update of IP address. The data of the video stream is 
inside the UDP packets. The video was playing all the time except for the time when the 
update was done. When both network interfaces was set to down the video stopped, 
since there was no Internet connection anymore. However, when one of the two 
network interfaces was set active it resumed.  
Overall InfraHIP worked quite well, except for some random malfunctions that had to 
be resolved with restart of the HIP daemon and other software. 
5.2.3 OpenHIP and OpenVPN 
This test will be investigating OpenHIP as the mobility protocol and OpneVPN as the 
VPN application. OpenVPN is as described earlier a VPN using SSL/TLS to achieve 
the demanded security. The combination of OpenHIP and OpenVPN is at this point the 
best combination on HIP implementation and VPN to achieve mobile VPN and reach a 
broad user base, because they are both compatible with both Linux and Windows 
systems and OpenVPN is fairly lightweight as a VPN-client. 
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The test is a two part test. The first part examines the concept of OpenHIP and 
OpenVPN working together. The second part tests the mobility. The test is executed on 
two virtual computers running a Linux system, Ubuntu 9.04. Computer A will pose as 
the client and it has two network interfaces. Computer B acts as the server and has the 
same IP throughout the whole test, while Computer A randomly changes between its 
interfaces in the mobility test. Both machines are running OpenHIP version 0.7 an 
OpenVPN version 2.11_rc11. The VPN will be tested only by a point-to-point tunnel 
between the client and the server. This test is enough to prove the concept, since more 
advanced setups all have this type of connection. 
Server and Client configuration files can be found in the Appendix C. However the 
client is uses the locally configured LSI as the remote address. Computer(A) is 
configured to have the IP 10.8.0.2 and Computer(B) 10.8.0.1. 
OpenHIP and OpenVPN proof of concept 
The proof of concept test was a success. After both machines had started their OpenHIP 
software and started the OpenVPN with their separate configurations, a point-to-point 
tunnel was successfully created with the LSI of Computer(B) as remote address. This 
forces Computer(A) to use HIP, which was successfully negotiated and set up. As proof 
Computer(A) is able to log in over SSH to Computer(B) over the newly created point-
to-point tunnel on the configured address 10.8.0.1. This is shown in Figures 27 and 28. 
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Figure 27. A point-to-point connection is successfully set up over HIP. Computer(A) is 
able to login to the server over SSH and the created point-to-point connection.. 
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Figure 28. The server, Computer(B), of the test. The figure shows that OpenVPN sets up 
the connection using the locally configured LSI (1.181.204.51) of Computer(A). This is 
a proof that the connection is set up over HIP. 
OpenHIP and OpenVPN - mobility  
The mobility test starts in the same way as the proof of concept test. However, after the 
connection is set up, Computer(A) randomly changes the state of own network 
interfaces between “up” and “down”. The expected result is that the VPN connection 
stays alive while the HIP connection will be updated or re-negotiate.  
Figure 29 depicts the client side, Computer(A) is  in a make-before-break scenario. 
 
Figure 29. A series of successful updates sent from the client, Computer(A), to the 
server, Computer(B).  
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Figure 30 depicts the server side, Computer(B), in a make-before-break scenario. 
 
Figure 30. A series of successful updates sent from the client, Computer(A), to the 
server, Computer(B). 
Figure 31 shows that in a break-before-make scenario the client, Computer(A), tries to 
change the HIP connection to the point-to-point tunnel interface causing the 
communication to break and to remain unestablished. 
 
Figure 31. The client side tries to use the point-to-point interface as its communication 
link. 
Verdict, OpenHIP and OpenVPN in combination is a promising combination and it 
works great in make-before-break scenarios. However, in scenarios where the 
connection is lost OpenHIP tries to use the only “active” network interface available 
which is the point-to-point interface causing the connection to break and renders it non-
renegotiable for as long as the point-to-point is available. Even if the other interfaces 
states are set to “up” OpenHIP does not change its preferred address from the point-to-
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point address to these. If it would be possible to exclude interfaces in the configuration 
of OpenHIP, this would not be a problem. 
5.2.4 OpenHIP and SSH  
There are two types of tests conducted in this section. The first test is the proof of 
concept and the second test will determine mobility and maturity. In this test OpenHIP 
and SSH will be used to mount a network drive to one computer from another. The 
OpenHIP SSH combination is expected to work together and provide easy to use 
Mobile VPN for the end user.  
Setup consists of two computers running Linux, Ubuntu 9.04 and OpenHIP 0.7 binary 
build. The tools for mounting a network drive over SSH is a built-in feature in Gnome 
which comes as standard on Ubuntu.  
The first test is to test the concept of the protocol and program combination. This is 
done without mobility being tested. The second stage tests the mobility if the first stage 
is successful. 
Configuration of the OpenHIP known hosts file has been done before the tests are run. 
This configuration is made so that the computers can find each other since no DNS or 
rendezvous functionality is used.  
OpenHIP and SSH – proof of concept 
Computer(A) will attempt to mount the home folder of Computer(B) by using the HIP 
of Computer(B) as address for the SSH connection. The test is expected to run the HIP 
Base Exchange when SSH is called with the HIT of Computer(B) and before SSH 
negotiation. After HIP Base Exchange and SSH negotiation is done it is expected that 
the mounted network drive, the home folder of Computer(B), will be visible and 
function as a drive unit on Computer(A). 
Figures 32 and 33 depict that proof of concept testing was successful. 
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Figure 32. The HIP Base Exchange is done before SSH negotiation, initiator. 
 
Figure 33. The mounted network drive is ready for use. As seen in the address bar it is 
using the peer HIT as address. 
 OpenHIP and SSH – mobility 
Since the proof of concept testing is successful, the protocol and program setup can 
proceed to mobility testing. Mobility is tested by changing the states of the network 
interface of Computer(A). It is expected that the interface states can be changed 
randomly in both make-before-break and break-before-make scenarios. It is also 
expected that it will not be necessary for the OpenHIP software to do any re-negotiation 
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in the form of new Base Exchanges. Rather HIP update is expected to provide the 
necessary information to Computer(A) and Computer(B). If re-negotiation is needed the 
mobility is broken and session persistence is not achieved. 
The combination of OpenHIP and SSH performed very well in the mobility tests. All 
make-before-break scenarios worked as expected. However break-before-make did not 
work and re-negotiation by the HIP software occurred. Thereby the session persistence 
was lost, but after the renegotiation the communication worked as well as before. 
Figures 34, 35 and 36 show successful HIP updates and that the mounted network drive 
stays connected and operational. 
 
Figure 34. Make-before-break HIP update and the mounted network drive stays 
operational, (Computer(A)). 
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Figure 35. Make-before-break HIP-update and network drive stays operational, 
(Computer(A)). 
 
Figure 36. HIP update messages being received and processed by the responder 
(Computer(B)), no re-negotiation needed. 
Figures 37, 38 and 39 show how the break-before-make scenario did not work and how 
Computer(A) and Computer(B) had to re-negotiate their HIP SAs. Both network 
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interfaces are down in Figure 37 and Computer(A) tries to use own IPv6 localhost for 
interface. In Figure 38 network interface eth0 of Computer(A) is turned on, and HIP 
update messages sent by Computer(A) are refused by Computer(B). This leads to HIP 
re-negotiation through a new HIP Base Exchange. Figure 39 shows Computer(B) 
refusing the HIP-updates and the re-negotiation. 
 
Figure 37. Computer(A) HIP update messages are impossible since there is no working 
interface. Also the mounted network is not operational at this point. 
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Figure 38. The HIP SA is re-negotiated after HIP update messages failed. The mounted 
network drive is again operational. 
 
Figure 39. Computer(B) refusing HIP update messafes and re-negotiates a HIP SA. 
The OpenHIP and SSH combination was a successful combination and the same 
functionality can be expected from OpenHIP Windows Client. Still it was not perfect 
since the break-before-make did not work. 
74 
 
Verdict, this combination and OpenHIP in general seems to be very stable. Even if it 
didn’t pass all expected tests, it still performed well and predictably. 
5.2.5 Ocala – HIP proxy 
The Ocala software is supposed to provide a generic proxy for which different plugins 
providing different protocols can be used. However, the Ocala –project has not been 
active since 2006 and because of that the testing has been extremely complicated. 
Since Ocala and the HIP plug-in demand various libraries and a custom kernel, it is hard 
to produce a working test environment including a working Ocala proxy and a HIP 
plugin. The reason is that the Linux kernel has been updated many times since Ocala 
was developed. Ocala and the HIP plugin are threfore not compatible with kernels of 
present date. A custom built kernel from about 2006 compiled with the custom modules 
provided by OpenHIP or InfraHIP is required.  
No tests have yet been successful. Therefore testing with Ocala remains undone. 
However, the theory behind the Ocala proxy is good, and if the project would be still 
running it would probably be one of the better solutions for providing Mobile VPN. 
5.3 Practical conclusion 
The practical part has reviewed several different solutions on how to provide Mobile 
VPN. However none of the solutions using the experimental protocol HIP was 100% 
successful. This proves that HIP is not yet ready to be introduced as a Mobile VPN 
solution for common use. However, HIP has great performance and low overhead when 
it is working. HIP can be recommended for professionals and enthusiasts. Figure 40 
shows the different conclusions for the tests done. 
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f = full support 
p = partial support (mostly 
successful) 
n = none, or most tests failed 
Protocol implementation OpenVPN   
SSH hdd 
mapping   
  concept mobility concept mobility 
OpenHIP f p f f 
InfraHIP f n f p 
Figure 40. The success of the different HIP implementations and different programs.  
The evaluation of other protocols and programs has been strictly theoretical, reviewing 
features and architectural design. These solutions have been based on MIP. Programs 
using MIP for Mobile VPN are already commercially available, and companies such as 
Cisco have developed their own Mobile VPN. Even though MIP is a developed protocol 
improvements and new ideas are still under development for the protocol and for the 
use of the protocol. The SUM architecture is described earlier is a good example of this.  
Present solutions using MIP or MIP and MOBIKE are far more successful for common 
use of Mobile IP than solutions based on HIP. The reason is the immaturity of HIP.  
6 DISCUSSION 
This Bc.S. thesis has examined the mobility protocols HIP and MIP as well as the 
security protocols IPsec, SSL/TLS and SSH. Also MOBIKE has been examined. 
MOBIKE ties together the mobility protocols and IPsec protocol. An evaluation of the 
protocols supports the understanding of the practical part of the thesis. However, the 
practical part has been focused mostly on implementations using HIP. The reason is my 
involvement with the WISEciti project in ARCADA with its focus on HIP. HIP is a 
mobility protocol which is not yet implemented in commercial VPN solutions. 
Therefore no complete solution is offered yet. The practical part has examined two 
different HIP implementations OpenHIP and InfraHIP. These have been identically 
tested with different software to determine the best combination of protocol 
implementation and VPN software. The tests showed that OpenHIP, which is developed 
and used by Boeing, was much more mature than the rival InfraHIP. InfraHIP, which is 
developed by HIIT, is presently used for testing and for scientific experiments.  
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The practical part has been a bit changed from the original plan. The plan was to test as 
many protocols and VPN solutions as possible. This turned out to be harder and more 
time consuming than first expected. Also, limitations on the hardware available during 
the thesis project have been an issue. Furthermore, the practical part has been quite 
successful in determining the usability and maturity of both available HIP 
implementations and how these implementations can be used with present programs, 
that offer different features and levels of security. Even though the SSH solution is not a 
real VPN solution, I think it shows how HIP can easily provide security and mobility to 
ordinary users. 
To conclude this Bc.S. thesis, the plan has been followed in terms of content but not in 
terms of the time schedule. The part which differs most from the plan  is the practical 
part. This was also the part that I paid the least attention to during the plan, since I 
thought it would sort itself out. In my opinion, the thesis been successful, but it has over 
time evolved in a different direction than the plan originally outlined. 
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APPENDIX A: MOBIKE - MN CHANGES POINT OF 
ATTATCHMENT 
This example illustrates how a MN changes its point of access and updates the change 
to the IPsec gateway (RFC 4555. 2006). 
  Step 1 is the normal IKE_INIT exchange;  
 
      Initiator                  Responder 
     -----------                ----------- 
  (IP_I1:500 -> IP_R1:500) 
      HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni, 
           N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP), 
           N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  --> 
 
                            <--  (IP_R1:500 -> IP_I1:500) 
                                 HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, 
                                      N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP), 
                                      N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) 
 
   Step 2, the peers inform each other that they support MOBIKE; 
 
      Initiator                  Responder 
     -----------                ----------- 
   (IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R1:4500) 
      HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH, 
                CP(CFG_REQUEST), 
                SAi2, TSi, TSr, 
                N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED) }  --> 
 
                            <--  (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I1:4500) 
                                 HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH, 
                                           CP(CFG_REPLY), 
                                           SAr2, TSi, TSr, 
                                           N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED) } 
 
   (Initiator gets information from lower layers that its attachment 
   point and IP address have changed.) 
 
Step 3, the initiator notices a change in its own IP address and informs the responder 
about this by sending an INFORMATIONAL request containing the 
UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification. The request is sent using the new IP address.  
At this point, it also starts to use the new address as  a source address in its own 
outgoing ESP traffic.  Upon receiving the UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification, the 
responder records the new address and, if it is required by policy, performs a return 
routability check of the IP address; 
 
  
 
 
  Initiator                  Responder 
     -----------                ----------- 
   IP_I2:4500 -> IP_R1:4500) 
      HDR, SK { N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES), 
                N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP), 
                N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }  --> 
 
                            <-- (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I2:4500) 
                                HDR, SK { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP), 
                                     N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) } 
 
   (Responder verifies that the initiator has given it a correct IP 
   address.) 
 
Step 4, when the routability check is completed the responder starts to use the new 
address as the destination for its outgoing ESP traffic; 
 
      Initiator                  Responder 
     -----------                ----------- 
                       <-- (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I2:4500) 
                                HDR, SK { N(COOKIE2) } 
 
      (IP_I2:4500 -> IP_R1:4500) 
      HDR, SK { N(COOKIE2) }  --> 
 
  
  
 
 
APPENDIX B: COMPILATION GUIDE FOR WIRESHARK WITH 
HIP PATCH 
This guide is for Ubuntu/Linux and does not take any other distributions or operating 
systems into consideration. This guide will step by step show how to get the source 
needed and how to patch it and compile it to a working version of Wireshark with 
support for HIP. 
Step 1, Download the source needed, Wireshark v1.0.7 from http://media-
2.cacetech.com/wireshark/src/wireshark-1.0.7.tar.bz2. and the needed patch from 
InfraHIP homepage; http://hipl.hiit.fi/hipl/hipl.tar.gz 
Step 2, Get the build essentials for Wireshark by executing the command sudo apt-get 
build-dep wireshark. 
Step 3, Patch Wireshark, locate the patch in the source from infrahip, in the folder 
patches/ethereal/. The patches used are wireshark-1.1.0-hip.patch and wireshark-1.1.0-
hip-midauth.patch.  
Step 4, Go to the Wireshark folder that contains the autogen.sh and execute the 
following commands; 
patch -p1 < <PATH-TO-PATCH>/wireshark-1.1.0-hip.patch 
patch -p1 < <PATH-TO-PATCH>/wireshark-1.1.0-hip-midauth.patch 
./autogen.sh 
./configure 
make 
sudo make install 
Step 5, This should compile without problem and a HIP supporting version of 
Wireshark is created. To see that HIP actually is supported, start Wireshark, go to Edit-
>Preference->supported protocols and browse until HIP is found. Alternatively run an 
application using HIP and see that it recognizes it. 
If there is any problem with patching or compiling, please refer to the individual project 
documentation. 
  
 
 
APPENDIX C: OPENVPN CONFIGURATION FILES AND SETUP 
The static.key is a static key to be useds as an pre-shared secret between the server and 
the client. The key is generated with the command: openvpn --genkey --secret 
static.key. The since the static key is a shared secret it has to be shared and not 
generated individually for the server and the client. 
The configuration provided creates a virtual network interface for both the client and the 
server. The VPN tunnel is created with the server end-point 10.8.0.1 and the client at 
10.8.0.2. The encrypted communication will be created with UDP and the port used is 
1194. The remote variable in the client configuration is IP address or the domain name 
of the server. The server is passive and waits for a client to connect. If the shared secret 
is correct a secure VPN tunnel is created. 
The OpenVPN server and client have to be started with root privileges, in Ubuntu; sudo 
openvpn --config openVPN_client.conf for the client and openvpn --config 
openVPN_server.conf for the server. 
Configuration for InfraHIP and OpenVPN 
Client configuration 
#openVPN_client.conf 
 
#Here we are using the locally added LSI for our server running HIP 
remote 10.0.0.50 
 
dev tun 
ifconfig 10.8.0.2 10.8.0.1 
secret static.key 
Server configuration 
#openVPN_server.conf 
port 1194 
dev tun 
ifconfig 10.8.0.1 10.8.0.2 
secret static.key 
 
  
 
 
Configuration files for OpenHIP and OpenVPN 
Client configuration 
#openVPN_client.conf 
 
port 1194 
#Here we are using the locally added LSI for our server running HIP 
 
Remote 1.181.204.50 
dev tun 
ifconfig 10.8.0.2 10.8.0.1 
secret static.key 
Server configuration 
#openVPN_server.conf 
port 1194 
dev tun 
ifconfig 10.8.0.1 10.8.0.2 
secret static.key 
